Abstract-In this article, the design of secure lattice coset codes for general wireless channeIs with fading and Gaussian noise is studied. Recalling the eavesdropper's probability and information bounds, a variant of the latter is given from wh ich it is explicitly seen that both quantities are upper bounded by (increasing functions of) the expected flatness factor of the faded lattice related to the eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wireless wiretap scheme two legitimate COlmnunication parties, Alice and Bob, exchange information in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. In this setting, the communication parties rely on physical layer security rather than cryptographic protocols. Hence, Eve is assumed to have no computational limitations and know the cryptographic key, if any, but to have a worse signal quality than Bob.
The objective of code design in a wiretap channel is to maximize the data rate and Bob's correct decoding probability while minimizing Eve's information. It was shown in the seminal paper of Wyner [1] that the legitimate parties can design codes with asymptotically non-zero rate, zero error probability and zero information leakage. Today, this setup is particularly interesting in wireless channels that are open in nature but vulnerable to distortions As a practical construction of a wiretap code, [2] introduced the general technique of coset coding, where random bits are added to the message to confuse the eavesdropper. In the specific case of a wireless channel, where lattice codes are suitable, the code lattice Ab is endowed with a sublattice Ae C Ab wh ich carries the random bits [3] .
A. Related Work and Contributions
The security of lattice coset codes can be quantized either by Eve's correct decision probability, or alternatively by the mutual information of the message and Eve's received signal. For the additive white Gaussian noise (A WGN) channel, upper bounds are known for both approaches [3] , [4] and, more importantly, both are increasing functions of the jlatness Jactor of the lattice Ae . Sequences of lattice coset codes achieving security and reliability are also constructed in [4] .
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978-1-5090-0919-0/16/$31 .00 ©2016 IEEE For fading channel models, probability and information bounds were derived in [5] , [6] , and [7] , [8] , respectively. Codes achieving security and reliability in the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel were given in [8] . In this paper, we recall the strategy of [5] , [6] and give a variant of the information bounds. With this streamlined introductory computation, we obtain bounds wh ich are increasing functions of the expected flatness factor of the faded lattice related to the eavesdropper. The agreement of the probability and information approaches is hence explicit, and a natural generalization of the AWGN case. The computations hold in any channel model with linear fading and Gaussian noise. We remark that, to the best of our knowledge, the steps towards practical code designs in low dimensions, such as [9] , are based on the probability bounds. A more detailed discussion and derivation of these bounds can be found in a subsequent article [10] .
Motivated by this, we show how to use an approximation of the theta series of a lattice, recently derived in [11] , to efficiently compute the average flatness factor of a given lattice. Hence, we do not need to rely on further approximations for the informationlprobability bounds, e.g., the COlmnon approach using the inverse norm sum in SISO channels [5] . We exemplify this in the Rayleigh fast fading channel, and see an agreement between our numerical computations and the geometric design heuristics and simulations results in [9] . In particular, this agreement supports the expectation that the flatness factor not only bounds but also orders correctly the performance of different lattices, hence serving as a design criterion for practical low-dimensional constructions, as first suggested in [5] , [6] . Comparing to [9] , where average flatness factor heuristics are tested with simulations, our results suggest that it is indeed approachable for design heuristics as well as numerical computations.
LATTICES, THETA SERIES AND THE FLATNESS FACTOR
A lattice A C IR n is a discrete subgroup of IR n with the property that there exist s :s: n linearly independent vectors (b1, ... , b s ) of IRn such that s We say that (bI, ... , bs ) is a Z-basis of A, and call s :s: n the rank, and n the dimension of A. The lattice is Jull if s = n.
A lattice A' C IR n such that A' C A is called a sublattice of A, and A is referred to as a superlattice for A'.
For a convenient presentation, we define a generator matrix log(a,,(e-nT )) M A := [bI ... bsl E Mat (n x s, IR), and equivalently write ..\EA The theta series 8 A (q) converges absolutely if 0 :s: q < 1.
In this article, we will need to compute the theta se ries of lattices wh ich have been affected by random fading, i.e., with random generator matrices. Unfortunately, there is no known way of computing the theta series of a random lattice in closed form. The following result is thus crucial for our purposes. We refer to [11] for a more detailed version of this result. In Figure 1 we illustrate the accuracy of this approximation for various famous lattices for wh ich the theta series is known in closed form and thus can be computed explicitly.
A. Lattice Sums and Flatness Factor
Let us denote the probability density function (PDF) of the n-dimensional spherical Gaussian as
The index lAI N I is finite provided that dim(A) = dim(N). and its sums over a (possibly shifted) lattice A as
..\EA
We then have the identity (1) (2) Note that the additive group structure of a lattice is actually crucial in this work: these important formulas are based on the Poisson smmnation formula.
IH. SYSTEM MODEL AND COSET CODES
We consider a wireless fading channel with noise. Perfect channel state information is assumed at both receivers (CSIR), Bob and Eve; the transmitter is only assumed to know the channel statistics. As we are only interested in the eavesdropper's performance, we henceforth only consider the channel between Alice and Eve, and consequently forgo subscripts in the related quantities. Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters and their realizations with lowercase letters. Denote Alice's transmitted vector by x E JR n , so that the channel equation is given by
where h E Mat(m x n, JR) is the realization of the fading, and the noise vector N E JRm is composed of i.i.d. components N i rv N(O, 0'2). We assume that H has full rank almost surely, but need not be a square matrix. [5] , [6] .
To confuse Eve, Alice uses lattice coset coding. An original information vector thus corresponds not only to a lattice point, but to an entire coset, and the transmitted vector is then chosen randomly within the coset according to a distribution discussed below. More specifically, Alice is equipped with two nested 1) Alice chooses coset dass representatives uniformly at random, and the channel is a mod As channel. 2) Alice uses Gaussian coset coding. In the simplest setup, Alice chooses uniform representatives from a finite transmission region, and Eve's information is affected by the boundaries of that region. Naively speaking, if Eve has knowledge about the transmission region, she can 2The notation A b. Ae is chosen to indicate that the message intended for Bob is taken f rom Ab , while Ae is the lattice that is chosen to confuse Eve. often guess the transmitted vector correctly if the received vector lies outside of the transmission region . Our choice of setups can be roughly seen as removing such boundary effects by a modulo operation, and smoothing the boundary of the transmission region, respectively. The AWGN information bounds have been derived for these setups in [4] , and the information-theoretic results for the fading channels in [7] , [8] are for the Gaussian coset coding setup.
IV. INFORMATION AND PROBABILITY BOUNDS
Let Ab and Ae be of dimension n , and assume that Eve simply decodes the received signal to the dosest lattice point in Ae, h' Then, prob ability of Eve correctly decoding the message is upper bounded by [5] , [6] The first step is Fubini's theorem and the independence of N , Hand M, while the second step follows from the probability bound in the AWGN setup [3] . The bound is given for Rayleigh fading single-input single-output (SISO) and MIMO channels in [5] and [6] , respectively. We recall that the flatness factor is defined through (1) for non-full lattices as weil.
We will give a variant of the information bounds [7] , [8] [rom wh ich it is explicit that the bounds agree (up to constants) with this upper bound on the probability that Eve correctly decodes the message. Hence, to minimize this probability, it will be necessary to minimize the upper bound on the mutual information, and vice versa. 
A. The mod As Wiretap Channel
We first consider a strategy where the boundary of the shaping region set to be the boundary of V(As), where As is a third lattice As C Ae C Ab C JRn, called the shaping lattice. The random shifting vector Ae is chosen uniformly at random from the set of representatives of Ael As in V(A s).
Then, slightly artificially, we assume that Eve only receives knowledge of the equivalence dass y I As,h' 3This assumption is implicit in [4] The result follows. D
B. Discrete Gaussian Coset Coding
While an insightful scenario, the restrictions imposed in the mod As channel setting are not necessarily realistic. To be more general, we consider an approach, where the boundary is smoothed instead of removed. Here, the vectors Ae corresponding to the random bits are chosen so that the message X = AM + Ae follows the Gaussian distribution centered on the shifted lattice Ae + AM, that is, for all x E Ae + AM, (x ; a s) 
The rest of the proof is identical to Theorem I, using Jensen 's inequality for the first, and Markov's inequality for the second summand to obtain termwise bounds wh ich we can substitute back to (4) to conclude the proof. D
C. Observations
The information bounds tend to zero with the respective average ftatness factor. By the dual formula (2) for the ftatness factor, CA (a) decreases monotonously to zero as a --+ (X) for any A. As it only depends on ratios of the different parameters a, a s , a h, it is easy to deduce that the respective average ftatness factors also decrease monotonously to zero at poor signal quality. Hence, the bounds prove information-theoretic security for poor eavesdropper's channel quality.
The information bound of Theorem 2 involves the quantity
In reasonable scenarios, we have CJ2 I CJ; « 1, and it is easily
Hence, independent of the considered setup, the goal is to design a lattice Ae so that lEH [CAe, h(CJ)J is minimized, We remark that this quantity only depends on Ae and CJh I CJ, not for example on Ab, Using (1), we can also compute wh ich coincides up to constants with the probability bound (3), This is an important agreement of the probability and information approaches, We point out that the agreeing probability bound (3) has been analyzed with error terms in [5] and is asymptotic at poor signal quality, We thus expect the average ftatness factor to predict and correctly order the performance of different lattices at the interesting low-SNR regime,
In the following, we make use of Proposition 1 to approximate the average ftatness factor of different lattice coset codes numerically. The aim is to compare the predictions of OUf theta approximation to lattice design heuristics and channel simulations given e.g., in [9] , We focus on the SISO Rayleigh fading channel to allow for a comparison with the results obtained in [9] , and hence restrict the choice of channel matrices h to diagonal matrices, Even if Eve 's information only depends on Ae , to ensure a meaningful comparison between codes we fix a superlattice Ab (i.e. , fix Bob's vector decoding error probability) and the index 4 IAb l Ae I to match the information rate, For convenience, we define the variable T = 1/ (27rCJ 2 ) , and consider CA as a function of T, In the limit of large and small values of T, OUf quantity of interest of two different lattices of equal index converge to the same value. Hence, we will center our attention to a range of T where a difference is visible, wh ich in OUf plots corresponds to a very large range of values for CJ2, Remark 2. lt has been recently shown in [9] wh ich we interpret as index-16 sublattices of A = 71}, Some characteristics of these lattices are summarized in Table I . 4 As we are fixing a common superlattice fixing the index is equivalent to comparing sublattices of the same volume, n = 2 In arecent articIe [9] , the authors analyze the performance of three different index-256 sublattices of ;;34 with respect to Eve's decoding error probability. We denote the lattices by nl , n2 = 4 ;;34, and n3, with generator matrices given by In Figure 3 we compare all five presented lattices with respect to their average flatness factor. with what should be expected. Note that it is known that D 4 attains the maximum possible length of the shortest vector among lattices in dimension 4, and is moreover well-rounded. The order of the lattices [2 i , 1 ::; i ::; 3, agrees with the resuIts obtained in [9] . We note that [2 1 and [22 respect the statement from Remark 2, but their difference is almost negligible. The well-rounded lattice [23, however, is up to 1-1.5 dB ahead of [22. In addition, we compare two index-302 sublattices of Z4 , of respective generator matrices As in the previous examples, the well-rounded lattice f 2 exhibits a smaller average flatness factor than f 1, and the difference reaches up to 2 dB. This is in agreement with the simulation results obtained in [9] . VI. CONCLUSIONS We studied the design of sec ure lattice coset codes in a general wireless model with any fading and Gaussian noise, and focused on the mod As channel as weil as on Gaussian coset coding. Recalling the eavesdropper's probability bounds [5] , [6] and deriving a variant of the information bounds [7] , [8] we saw that both are an increasing function of the average flatness factor, i.e., the theta series of the faded eavesdroppers lattice A e, h averaged over channel realizations h.
We then computed numerically the average flatness factors of different faded lattices with help of an approximation of the theta series of a lattice derived in [11] . By making use of this result, computing the average flatness factor becomes computationally inexpensive, which allows us to avoid further additional approximations based e.g. , on the inverse norm sum o As already suggested [9] , our findings show that the property of being well-rounded, is necessary in order to minimize the average flatness factor and, hence, the upper bound on the eavesdropper's information. All our numerical computations agreed with the channel simulations in [9] .
Interesting further topics of investigation incIude the more detailed design of optimal sec ure lattice codes and, for SISO channels, the construction of sequences of codes where the information tends to zero. In both of these cases, well-rounded lattices studied in [9] will likely playa central role.
